Government CAs in the Microsoft Root Program

Microsoft was the first Root program in a browser to have an open and transparent process for becoming a CA as well as the first to have public policy, audit and technical requirements that CAs must comply with.

Today while the other browsers have joined on and even raised the bar significantly Microsoft continues to operate their root program in an open and clear way.

One example of this is the list they publish of the companies who meet their requirements; you can see this list here.

There are a number of interesting things we can gleam from this list; one of them is how many governments have their own certificate authorities.

For example as of March 11, 2011 we know that there are a total of 46 government owned and operated “Root Certificates” in the Microsoft Root Program, these include:

Current CA Owner Country Thumbprint
Government of Austria, Austria Telekom-Control Commission Austria e7 07 15 f6 f7 28 36 5b 51 90 e2 71 de e4 c6 5e be ea ca f3
Government of Brazil, Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira Brazil 8e fd ca bc 93 e6 1e 92 5d 4d 1d ed 18 1a 43 20 a4 67 a1 39
Government of Brazil, Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia da Informação (ITI) Brazil ‎70 5d 2b 45 65 c7 04 7a 54 06 94 a7 9a f7 ab b8 42 bd c1 61
Government of Finland, Population Register Centre Finland fa a7 d9 fb 31 b7 46 f2 00 a8 5e 65 79 76 13 d8 16 e0 63 b5
Government of France France 60 d6 89 74 b5 c2 65 9e 8a 0f c1 88 7c 88 d2 46 69 1b 18 2c
Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post Hong Kong (SAR) d6 da a8 20 8d 09 d2 15 4d 24 b5 2f cb 34 6e b2 58 b2 8a 58
Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post Hong Kong (SAR) e0 92 5e 18 c7 76 5e 22 da bd 94 27 52 9d a6 af 4e 06 64 28
Government of India, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology, Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA) India 97 22 6a ae 4a 7a 64 a5 9b d1 67 87 f2 7f 84 1c 0a 00 1f d0
Government of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan 96 83 38 f1 13 e3 6a 7b ab dd 08 f7 77 63 91 a6 87 36 58 2e
Government of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan ‎7f 8a b0 cf d0 51 87 6a 66 f3 36 0f 47 c8 8d 8c d3 35 fc 74
Government of Korea, Korea Information Security Agency (KISA) South Korea 5f 4e 1f cf 31 b7 91 3b 85 0b 54 f6 e5 ff 50 1a 2b 6f c6 cf
Government of Korea, Korea Information Security Agency (KISA) South Korea 02 72 68 29 3e 5f 5d 17 aa a4 b3 c3 e6 36 1e 1f 92 57 5e aa
Government of Korea, Korea Information Security Agency (KISA) South Korea f5 c2 7c f5 ff f3 02 9a cf 1a 1a 4b ec 7e e1 96 4c 77 d7 84
Government of Korea, Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) South Korea 63 4c 3b 02 30 cf 1b 78 b4 56 9f ec f2 c0 4a 86 52 ef ef 0e
Government of Korea, Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) South Korea 20 cb 59 4f b4 ed d8 95 76 3f d5 25 4e 95 9a 66 74 c6 ee b2
Government of Latvia, Latvian Post Latvia 08 64 18 e9 06 ce e8 9c 23 53 b6 e2 7f bd 9e 74 39 f7 63 16
Government of Latvia, Latvian State Radio & Television Centre (LVRTC) Latvia c9 32 1d e6 b5 a8 26 66 cf 69 71 a1 8a 56 f2 d3 a8 67 56 02
Government of Lithuania, Registru Centras Lithuania 97 1d 34 86 fc 1e 8e 63 15 f7 c6 f2 e1 29 67 c7 24 34 22 14
Government of Macao, Macao Post Macao SAR ‎89 c3 2e 6b 52 4e 4d 65 38 8b 9e ce dc 63 71 34 ed 41 93 a3
Government of Mexico, Autoridad Certificadora Raiz de la Secretaria de Economia Mexico 34 d4 99 42 6f 9f c2 bb 27 b0 75 ba b6 82 aa e5 ef fc ba 74
Government of Portugal, Sistema de Certificação Electrónica do Estado (SCEE) / Electronic Certification System of the State Portugal ‎39 13 85 3e 45 c4 39 a2 da 71 8c df b6 f3 e0 33 e0 4f ee 71
Government of Serbia, PTT saobraćaja „Srbija” (Serbian Post) Serbia d6 bf 79 94 f4 2b e5 fa 29 da 0b d7 58 7b 59 1f 47 a4 4f 22
Government of Slovenia, Posta Slovenije (POSTArCA) Slovenia ‎b1 ea c3 e5 b8 24 76 e9 d5 0b 1e c6 7d 2c c1 1e 12 e0 b4 91
Government of Slovenia, Slovenian General Certification Authority (SIGEN-CA) Slovenia 3e 42 a1 87 06 bd 0c 9c cf 59 47 50 d2 e4 d6 ab 00 48 fd c4
Government of Slovenia, Slovenian Governmental Certification Authority (SIGOV-CA) Slovenia 7f b9 e2 c9 95 c9 7a 93 9f 9e 81 a0 7a ea 9b 4d 70 46 34 96
Government of Spain (CAV), Izenpe S.A. Spain 4a 3f 8d 6b dc 0e 1e cf cd 72 e3 77 de f2 d7 ff 92 c1 9b c7
Government of Spain (CAV), Izenpe S.A. Spain ‎30 77 9e 93 15 02 2e 94 85 6a 3f f8 bc f8 15 b0 82 f9 ae fd
Government of Spain, Autoritat de Certificació de la Comunitat Valenciana (ACCV) Spain a0 73 e5 c5 bd 43 61 0d 86 4c 21 13 0a 85 58 57 cc 9c ea 46
Government of Spain, Dirección General de la Policía – Ministerio del Interior – España. Spain b3 8f ec ec 0b 14 8a a6 86 c3 d0 0f 01 ec c8 84 8e 80 85 eb
Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) Spain 43 f9 b1 10 d5 ba fd 48 22 52 31 b0 d0 08 2b 37 2f ef 9a 54
Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) Spain b8 65 13 0b ed ca 38 d2 7f 69 92 94 20 77 0b ed 86 ef bc 10
Government of Sweden, Inera AB (SITHS-Secure IT within Health care Service) Sweden 16 d8 66 35 af 13 41 cd 34 79 94 45 eb 60 3e 27 37 02 96 5d
Government of Switzerland, Bundesamt für Informatik und Telekommunikation (BIT) Switzerland ‎6b 81 44 6a 5c dd f4 74 a0 f8 00 ff be 69 fd 0d b6 28 75 16
Government of Switzerland, Bundesamt für Informatik und Telekommunikation (BIT) Switzerland ‎25 3f 77 5b 0e 77 97 ab 64 5f 15 91 55 97 c3 9e 26 36 31 d1
Government of Taiwan, Government Root Certification Authority (GRCA) Taiwan ROC f4 8b 11 bf de ab be 94 54 20 71 e6 41 de 6b be 88 2b 40 b9
Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid The Netherlands 10 1d fa 3f d5 0b cb bb 9b b5 60 0c 19 55 a4 1a f4 73 3a 04
Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid The Netherlands 59 af 82 79 91 86 c7 b4 75 07 cb cf 03 57 46 eb 04 dd b7 16
Government of the United States of America, Federal PKI USA 76 b7 60 96 dd 14 56 29 ac 75 85 d3 70 63 c1 bc 47 86 1c 8b
Government of the United States of America, Federal PKI USA cb 44 a0 97 85 7c 45 fa 18 7e d9 52 08 6c b9 84 1f 2d 51 b5
Government of the United States of America, Federal PKI USA ‎90 5f 94 2f d9 f2 8f 67 9b 37 81 80 fd 4f 84 63 47 f6 45 c1
Government of Tunisia, Agence National de Certification Electronique / National Digital Certification Agency (ANCE/NDCA) Tunisia 30 70 f8 83 3e 4a a6 80 3e 09 a6 46 ae 3f 7d 8a e1 fd 16 54
Government of Tunisia, Agence National de Certification Electronique / National Digital Certification Agency (ANCE/NDCA) Tunisia d9 04 08 0a 49 29 c8 38 e9 f1 85 ec f7 a2 2d ef 99 34 24 07
Government of Turkey, Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi (Kamu SM) Turkey 1b 4b 39 61 26 27 6b 64 91 a2 68 6d d7 02 43 21 2d 1f 1d 96
Government of Uruguay, Correo Uruguayo Uruguay f9 dd 19 26 6b 20 43 f1 fe 4b 3d cb 01 90 af f1 1f 31 a6 9d
Government of Venezuela, Superintendencia de Servicios de Certificación Electrónica (SUSCERTE) Venezuela ‎dd 83 c5 19 d4 34 81 fa d4 c2 2c 03 d7 02 fe 9f 3b 22 f5 17
Government of Venezuela, Superintendencia de Servicios de Certificación Electrónica (SUSCERTE) Venezuela ‎39 8e be 9c 0f 46 c0 79 c3 c7 af e0 7a 2f dd 9f ae 5f 8a 5c

 

With a closer look we see that these 46 certificates are operated by 33 different agencies in 26 countries.

 

Wikipedia tells us there are 207 governments and now we know apparently 14% of them operate their own globally trusted root.

 

Though I love to travel and I consider myself a citizen of the world I have never needed to communicate with any of these governments using their private PKIs so I personally have marked them as “revoked” in CryptoAPI, I also manage which of the commercial root CAs I trust manually.

There are some other interesting observations we can gleam from the Root Program membership also, I will do more posts on these later.

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