<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Following my recent post about another CA failing the \u201cTuring test\u201d<\/a> with a likely MITM certificate issuance, let\u2019s examine a troubling pattern: the role of government-run and government-affiliated CAs in the WebPKI ecosystem. This incident brings attention to Microsoft\u2019s root program, what is clear is a fundamental contradiction persists: we\u2019re trusting entities whose institutional incentives often directly conflict with the security goals of the WebPKI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Let me be clear\u2014CAs and root programs serve critical functions in the WebPKI. As I discussed in my article about Trust On First Use<\/a>, attempting to build trust without them leads to even worse security outcomes. The issue isn\u2019t whether we need CAs\u2014we absolutely do. The question is whether our current trust model, which treats all CAs as equally trustworthy regardless of their incentives and constraints, actually serves our security goals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n History has repeatedly shown that the temptation to abuse these capabilities is simply too great. Whether it\u2019s decision-makers acting in their perceived national interest or CAs that fail to understand\u2014or choose to ignore\u2014the consequences of their actions, we keep seeing the same patterns play out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The removal of DarkMatter as a CA due to its affiliation with the UAE government, despite its clean record in this context, starkly contrasts with the continued trust granted to other government-affiliated CAs with documented failures. This inconsistency highlights a deeper flaw in root programs: Rules are often applied reactively, addressing incidents after they occur, rather than through proactive, continuous, and consistent enforcement. If you read yesterday’s post<\/a>, you may recall my 2011 post<\/a> on the number of government-run or affiliated CAs. The intervening years have given us a clear pattern of failures. Whether through compromise, willful action, or \u201caccidents\u201d (take that as you will), here are just the incidents I can recall off the top of my head\u2014I\u2019m sure there are more:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fundamental problem isn\u2019t just technical\u2014it\u2019s economic. While some root programs genuinely prioritize security, inconsistencies across the ecosystem remain a critical challenge. The broader issue is not simply about convenience but about conflicting incentives\u2014balancing compatibility, regulatory pressures, and market demands often at the expense of doing what is best for end users.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Value Proposition<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Core Contradiction<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Consider that a CA under government oversight faces fundamentally different pressures than one operating purely as a business. While both might fail, the failure modes and their implications for users differ dramatically. Yet our root programs largely pretend these differences don\u2019t exist.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe DarkMatter Paradox<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\nA History of Predictable Failures<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n
The Economics of (In)Security<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
CAs face strong incentives to maintain their trusted status but relatively weak incentives to uphold the rigorous security practices users expect. The cost of their security failure is largely borne by users, while the benefits of looser practices accrue directly to the CA. Audits, much like those in financial scandals such as Wirecard or Enron<\/a>, often serve as window dressing. With CAs selecting and paying their auditors, incentives rarely align with rigorous enforcement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The long tail of rarely-discussed CAs is particularly concerning. Many root certificates in browser trust stores belong to CAs that issue only dozens to hundreds of certificates annually, not the thousands or millions that major CAs produce. Some haven\u2019t issued a certificate in ages but retain the capability to do so\u2014and with it, the ability to compromise security for months or longer. It wouldn’t be unreasonable to say these low-volume CAs pose risks far outweighing their utility.<\/p>\n\n\n\nCertificate Transparency: Necessary but Not Sufficient<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n