{"id":1055,"date":"2025-06-16T09:50:46","date_gmt":"2025-06-16T17:50:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/?p=1055"},"modified":"2025-06-16T10:23:23","modified_gmt":"2025-06-16T18:23:23","slug":"webpki-market-analysis-mozilla-telemetry-vs-certificate-transparency-data","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/?p=1055","title":{"rendered":"WebPKI Market Analysis: Mozilla Telemetry vs Certificate Transparency Data"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In the past, I’ve written about how to measure the WebPKI<\/a>, and from time to time I post brief updates on how the market is evolving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The other day, Matthew McPherrin posted<\/a> a script<\/a> showing how to use Mozilla telemetry data to analyze which Certificate Authorities are more critical to the web. Specifically, what percentage of browsing relies on each CA<\/strong>. Mozilla provides public data from Firefox’s telemetry on how many times a CA is used to successfully validate certificates. This is a pretty good measure for how “big” a CA actually is. The data is pretty hard to view in Mozilla’s public systems though, so he made a script to combine a few data sources and graph it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"\/<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

I normally focus on total issuance numbers since they’re easier to obtain. That data comes from Certificate Transparency logs<\/strong>, which contain all publicly trusted certificates that you might encounter without seeing an interstitial warning about the certificate not being logged (like this example<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"\/<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the Data Reveals<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Both datasets feature many of the same major players. But there are some striking differences that reveal important insights about the WebPKI ecosystem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Let’s Encrypt dominates certificate issuance at 46.1%<\/strong> of all certificates. But it ranks third in Firefox’s actual usage telemetry. This suggests Let’s Encrypt serves many lower-traffic sites. Meanwhile, Google Trust Services leads in Firefox usage<\/strong> while ranking second in certificate issuance volume. This shows how high-traffic sites can amplify a CA’s real-world impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DigiCert ranks second in Firefox usage<\/strong> while placing fourth in certificate issuance volume at 8.3%. This reflects their focus on major enterprise customers. With clients like Meta<\/strong> (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp), they secure some of the world’s highest-traffic websites. This “fewer certificates, massive impact”<\/strong> approach drives them up the usage charts despite not competing on volume with Let’s Encrypt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Google’s dominance<\/strong> reflects more than just their own properties like Google.com, YouTube, and Gmail. Google Cloud offers arguably the best load balancer solution in the market<\/strong> (full disclosure I worked on this project). You get TLS by default for most configurations. Combined with their global network that delivers CDN-like benefits out of the gate, this attracts major platforms like Wix and many others to build on Google Cloud. When these platforms choose Google’s infrastructure, they automatically inherit Google Trust Services certificates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Looking at the usage data reveals other interesting patterns. Deutsche Telekom Security, <\/b>Government of Turkey,<\/b><\/s> (UPDATE: <\/strong>turns out the Turkey entry is a Firefox bug: they\u2019re using bucket #1 for both locally installed roots and Kamu SM, apparently by accident) and SECOM Trust Systems<\/strong> all appear prominently in Firefox telemetry but barely register in issuance numbers. In some respects, it’s no surprise that government-issued certificates see disproportionate usage. Government websites are often mandated for use<\/strong>. Citizens have to visit them for taxes, permits, benefits, and other essential services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Microsoft Corporation<\/strong> appears significantly in issuance data (6.5%) but doesn’t register in the Firefox telemetry. This reflects their focus on enterprise and Windows-integrated scenarios rather than public web traffic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

GoDaddy<\/strong> shows strong issuance numbers (10.5%) but more modest representation in browsing telemetry. This reflects their massive domain parking operations<\/strong>. They issue certificates for countless parked domains that receive minimal actual user traffic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why This Matters<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Mozilla Firefox represents under 3%<\/strong> of global browser market share<\/a>. This telemetry reflects a smaller segment of internet users. While this data provides valuable insights into actual CA usage patterns, it would be ideal if Chrome released similar telemetry data<\/strong>. Given Chrome’s dominant 66.85% market share<\/strong>, their usage data would dramatically improve our understanding of what real WebPKI usage actually looks like across the broader internet population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The contrast between certificate issuance volume and actual browsing impact reveals important truths about internet infrastructure. CT logs currently show over 450,000 certificates being issued per hour<\/a><\/strong> across all CAs. Yet as this Firefox telemetry data shows, much of that volume serves lower-traffic sites while a smaller number of high-traffic certificates drive the actual user experience. Some CAs focus on high-volume, automated issuance<\/strong> for parked domains and smaller sites. Others prioritize fewer certificates for high-traffic, essential destinations<\/strong>. Understanding both metrics helps us better assess the real-world criticality of different CAs for internet security and availability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Raw certificate counts don’t tell the whole story<\/strong>. The websites people actually visit, and sometimes must visit, matter just as much as the sheer number of certificates issued. Some certificates protect websites with “captive audiences” or essential services, while others protect optional destinations. A government tax portal or YouTube will always see more traffic than the average small business website, regardless of how many certificates each CA issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regardless of how you count, I’ve had the pleasure of working closely with at least 7 of the CAs<\/strong> in the top 10 in their journeys to become publicly trusted CAs. Each of these CAs have had varying goals for their businesses and operations, and that’s exactly why you see different manifestations in the outcomes. Let’s Encrypt focused on automation and volume. DigiCert targeted enterprise customers. Google leveraged their cloud infrastructure. GoDaddy built around domain services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Either way, it’s valuable to compare and contrast these measurement approaches to see what the WebPKI really looks like beyond just raw certificate counts.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In the past, I’ve written about how to measure the WebPKI, and from time to time I post brief updates on how the market is evolving. The other day, Matthew McPherrin posted a script showing how to use Mozilla telemetry data to analyze which Certificate Authorities are more critical to the web. Specifically, what percentage […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[217,4,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1055","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-certificates","category-thoughts","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1055","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1055"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1055\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1055"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1055"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/unmitigatedrisk.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1055"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}