Monthly Archives: August 2026

From Periodic Audit to Continuous Assurance

I have been writing about the limitations of audits and compliance systems for several years.

In Accountability and Transparency in Modern Systems, I wrote about systems producing evidence continuously rather than assembling it periodically for an auditor.

In First Principles for Root Store Management, I looked back at the decision to require WebTrust for publicly trusted CAs and argued that, if we were designing the system today, much more of the trust decision should be based on continuously verifiable behavior.

That led to The Limitations of Audits, Rethinking Compliance, and Compliance at the Speed of Code.

The common thread was that the systems we are trying to assure change much faster than the mechanisms we use to understand them.

Over the last year, I have spent considerably more time on this problem, both thinking about it and building systems intended to work differently. That work convinced me that the problem is deeper than periodicity alone.

I have pulled that thinking together into two new long-form pieces.

They are intended to be read together.

The first explains how we got here.

The second explores what comes next.

From Chains to Trees

The WebPKI has two structures that are not the same shape.

One is a cryptographic graph of signed bindings. Public keys, names, entitlements, and the keys that authorized them. The other is a governance hierarchy of accountability. It explains why a relying party accepts that authority at all, and when it stops accepting it.

Nearly every interesting failure in the history of the system lives in the gap between them. Misissuance, compromise, distrust events, and the long struggle with revocation are all stories about that mismatch.

I wrote two long-form pieces that try to make the distinction legible.

The first walks through the classical system as it actually exists. What a certificate is, how trust is delegated, how root programs and policy actually work, and why the governance layer has always mattered more than the certificate chain itself.

A Deep Dive on the Classical WebPKI

The second examines the redesign now underway. Post-quantum signatures are simply too large for the classical model at public scale. The response is Merkle Tree Certificates. A CA logs certificates into its own tree, signs the tree head, and each certificate carries a short inclusion proof. One signature covers the batch. The proof is the path.

This is not merely a cryptographic migration. It is the ecosystem cashing in a forced upgrade to close a decade-old compromise in Certificate Transparency. Transparency stops being a post-issuance promise and becomes the issuance mechanism itself. The wire format changes. Most of the governance carries forward.

The Post-Quantum WebPKI