<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:trackback="http://madskills.com/public/xml/rss/module/trackback/" xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/" xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/" xmlns:copyright="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss" xmlns:image="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/image/">
    <channel>
        <title>Information Security</title>
        <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/category/1.aspx</link>
        <description>Information Security</description>
        <language>en-US</language>
        <copyright>Ryan M. Hurst</copyright>
        <managingEditor>rmh@unmitigatedrisk.com</managingEditor>
        <generator>Subtext Version 1.9.3.51</generator>
        <item>
            <title>Long time no see, lots of changes…</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2010/03/03/225.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;It’s been a very long time since I posted to the blog, that’s because there have been a bunch of changes in my life.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;As some of you may know I was divorced about a year ago, I essentially have sole custody of my son, I have lost 55 pounds, taken a new job where I do not work on Information Security and as a result of all of the above I spend very little time with things like Media Center and more time on things like cycling, hiking, skiing and so-on.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;In any event, my hope is that this post clarifies why I “disappeared”.  &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;As for the future of the blog, I have worked in Information Security almost my entire career and even though I no longer work in the area I still closely follow it and I expect to post here on these topics.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;I do not expect, at least in the near future you will see much on Media, I do expect to see some posts come down the line about personal things and bits about my new job.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;Thanks again,&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;Ryan&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/225.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2010/03/03/225.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Mar 2010 23:53:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/225.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2010/03/03/225.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/225.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/225.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>PB-TNC: A Posture Broker Protocol (PB) Compatible with TNC to be published tomorrow</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2010/03/03/224.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;This week is RSA, the largest security conference in the world; this is the 1st year in a very long time I won’t be there but, this year Scott Charney included a focus on the &lt;a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10462649-245.html?tag=newsEditorsPicksArea.0"&gt;Isolation of Infected Machines&lt;/a&gt; in his keynote.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font face=""&gt;The timing of this is excellent (for me) because a specification I worked on in the IETF around standardizing an evolution of one of the core protocols used in the Network Access Protection (NAP), the Microsoft uses in its product (and its own Networks) to isolate infected hosts on the network will be published &lt;a href="http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5973/"&gt;tomorrow&lt;/a&gt;, in the meantime the final draft is &lt;a href="http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-sahita-nea-pb-tnc-00.txt"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/224.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2010/03/03/224.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Mar 2010 23:42:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/224.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2010/03/03/224.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/224.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/224.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>White Paper Published: Introduction to the Windows Biometric Framework</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/12/23/219.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;We just recently published a new White Paper that provides a great &lt;a href="http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/device/input/smartcard/WBFIntro.mspx"&gt;Introduction to the Windows Biometric Framework&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/219.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/12/23/219.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2008 18:39:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/219.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/12/23/219.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/219.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/219.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Thinking outside-the-box, or loosing your privacy little by little</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/29/214.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;I ran across a neat &lt;a href="http://www.azarask.in/blog/post/socialhistoryjs/"&gt;article&lt;/a&gt; on using Javascript and default CSS behaviors to infer what &lt;a href="http://ha.ckers.org/weird/CSS-history.cgi"&gt;sites you frequent&lt;/a&gt;, this is not new, the earliest reference I could find of this was from &lt;a href="http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2006/08/i-know-where-youve-been.html"&gt;2006&lt;/a&gt; but I bet this has been going on for much longer.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;An example of analytics that can be applied to this data is that one follow is using your URL history to infer &lt;a href="http://www.mikeonads.com/2008/07/13/using-your-browser-url-history-estimate-gender/"&gt;gender&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;These are great examples of thinking outside the box and how privacy is an illusion (especially on the web).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/214.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/29/214.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2008 07:31:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/214.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/29/214.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/214.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/214.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Did you know you can disable the use of USB storage devices in Windows?</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/13/209.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;Well to be honest the only way to really stop the use of external storage devices is to whip out your epoxy and fill all the external ports on a machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;img border="0" alt="" align="left" width="166" height="109" src="http://www.hobbylinc.com/gr/dev/devs-208.jpg" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any policy that is locally enforced is a policy that can be bypassed by an attacker with local administrative privileges or physical access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Plus if the definition of an attacker also includes the authorized user of the machine there are vectors that do not involve physical media that can *&lt;strong&gt;and will&lt;/strong&gt;* be used (email, IM, web, etc.) to get the data off the machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With that being said it is actually possible disable the use of USB storage devices in Windows, I know a few companies who actually do this when paired with &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extrusion_prevention"&gt;Extrusion Prevention Systems&lt;/a&gt; and/or &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Rights_Management"&gt;Information Rights Management (IRM)&lt;/a&gt; systems (&lt;em&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Its important to note such systems are best effort also&lt;/strong&gt;, I suppose information does want to be free??&lt;/em&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mechanism I am speaking about is documented in &lt;a href="http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;823732"&gt;KB&lt;font face="Arial"&gt;823732&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, it is supported as of XP SP2 and once is set the devices function as read-only devices only.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;People should think carefully before deploying such a policy, there are plenty of legitimate reasons to use USB drives and doing this  and settings like this don't differentiate by use case.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/209.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/13/209.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Nov 2008 10:28:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/209.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/13/209.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/209.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/209.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>How to tell if a volume is Bitlocker protected with TPM and PIN</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/12/208.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;Today I was presented with a question, how can I tell if the OS volume is protected with Bitlocker a TPM and a PIN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since I could not sleep (its 2:30AM right now) I figured I would throw together a quick and dirty script that checks for that, it was pretty easy to do.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I started with the documentation for &lt;a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376483(VS.85).aspx"&gt;Win32_EncryptableVolume&lt;/a&gt; which I recall seeing previously in a unrelated mail at some point, from there I discovered the &lt;a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376441(VS.85).aspx"&gt;GetKeyProtectors&lt;/a&gt; method, I then did a search on &lt;a href="http://search.live.com/results.aspx?q=site%3Amicrosoft.com+GetKeyProtectors+VBSCRIPT&amp;amp;form=QBLH"&gt;Live&lt;/a&gt; for GetKeyProtectors and VBSCRIPT that was scoped to Microsoft.com domains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This got me a handful of samples, I took one hacked it up and came up with this:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;br /&gt;
' Get configuration we will need &lt;br /&gt;
' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;br /&gt;
' Get the OS System Drive &lt;br /&gt;
set shell = WScript.CreateObject( "WScript.Shell" ) &lt;br /&gt;
strDriveLetter = shell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%SystemDrive%") &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;' Target computer name &lt;br /&gt;
' Use "." to connect to the local computer &lt;br /&gt;
strComputerName = "." &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;br /&gt;
' Connect to the BitLocker WMI provider class &lt;br /&gt;
' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;strConnectionStr = "winmgmts:" _ &lt;br /&gt;
                 &amp;amp; "{impersonationLevel=impersonate,authenticationLevel=pktPrivacy}!\\" _ &lt;br /&gt;
                 &amp;amp; strComputerName _ &lt;br /&gt;
                 &amp;amp; "\root\cimv2\Security\MicrosoftVolumeEncryption" &lt;br /&gt;
On Error Resume Next 'handle permission errors &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Set objWMIService = GetObject(strConnectionStr) &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;If Err.Number &amp;lt;&amp;gt; 0 Then &lt;br /&gt;
     WScript.Echo "Failed to connect to the BitLocker interface (Error 0x" &amp;amp; Hex(Err.Number) &amp;amp; ")." &lt;br /&gt;
     Wscript.Echo "Ensure that you are running with administrative privileges." &lt;br /&gt;
     WScript.Quit -1 &lt;br /&gt;
End If &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;On Error GoTo 0 &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;br /&gt;
' Get a list of volumes that could be bitlocker protected. &lt;br /&gt;
' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;strQuery = "Select * from Win32_EncryptableVolume where DriveLetter='" &amp;amp; strDriveLetter &amp;amp; "'" &lt;br /&gt;
Set colTargetVolumes = objWMIService.ExecQuery(strQuery) &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;If colTargetVolumes.Count = 0 Then &lt;br /&gt;
    WScript.Echo "FAILURE: Unable to find BitLocker-capable drive " &amp;amp;  strDriveLetter &amp;amp; " on computer " &amp;amp; strComputerName &amp;amp; "." &lt;br /&gt;
    WScript.Quit -1 &lt;br /&gt;
End If &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;' there should only be one volume found &lt;br /&gt;
For Each objFoundVolume in colTargetVolumes &lt;br /&gt;
    set objVolume = objFoundVolume &lt;br /&gt;
Next &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;br /&gt;
' Now check if it was protected with a TPM and a PIN &lt;br /&gt;
' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;nKeyProtectorTypeIn = 4 ' type associated with "TPM and Pin" protector &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;nRC = objVolume.GetKeyProtectors(nKeyProtectorTypeIn, aKeyProtectorIDs) &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;If nRC &amp;lt;&amp;gt; 0 Then &lt;br /&gt;
WScript.Echo "FAILURE: GetKeyProtectors failed with return code 0x" &amp;amp; Hex(nRC) &lt;br /&gt;
WScript.Quit -1 &lt;br /&gt;
End If &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;' there should only be one volume found &lt;br /&gt;
For Each objFoundVolume in colTargetVolumes &lt;br /&gt;
    set objVolume = objFoundVolume &lt;br /&gt;
Next &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;br /&gt;
' Now return what we found. &lt;br /&gt;
' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- &lt;br /&gt;
On Error Resume Next 'handle unitialized array &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;If IsNull(aKeyProtectorIDs(0)) Then &lt;br /&gt;
    WScript.Echo "This volume is NOT TPM and PIN protected." &lt;br /&gt;
Else &lt;br /&gt;
    WScript.Echo "This volume IS TPM and PIN protected." &lt;br /&gt;
End If&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From the time I decided to write the script, to the time I wrote it and tested it was about 15 to 20 minutes; the samples were great, the MSDN documentation was pretty decent too; all this without ever doing anything with Bitlocker before, WMI is great stuff.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I may never use this but if nothing else it was quick and fun to throw together, maybe it will help you.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/208.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/12/208.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2008 10:47:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/208.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/12/208.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/208.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/208.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>What I have been up to for the last year...</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/07/207.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;A year ago I announced I took a new &lt;a href="http://www.unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2007/11/10/153.aspx"&gt;job&lt;/a&gt; back in Windows Security, I have not had much chance to blog since I took the new job but even if I did have the time I could not talk about the stuff I had been working on.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But times are a bit different now, a week ago was the Professional Developers Conference and this week was WinHEC; these were really the 1st events where Windows 7 became a public thing so now its safe for me to talk about what I have been up to.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As I said in a previous post my groups mission is to build platform technologies and solutions that enable secure password-less authentication into Windows, networks and the applications built on our platform.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To that end over the last year we have defined and delivered a platform for Biometric Devices in Windows, the "Windows Biometric Framework", this has been one of the best projects I have worked on at Microsoft.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Its just amazing that a year ago we had a whiteboard drawing and now we have a full platform and solutions built on that platform with support from great partners like &lt;a href="http://www.upek.com/news/press/2008/11.07.08.asp"&gt;Upek&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://www.authentec.com/news-item.cfm?newsID=394"&gt;Authentec&lt;/a&gt; (there are others too but I can't name them yet).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The cool bits of this project are in the platform, not in the user interface but the part people get to see is always a good place to start, in the "Hardware and Sound" control panel you now see a Biometric Devices control panel applet:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/images/unmitigatedrisk_com/WindowsLiveWriter/WhatIhavebeenuptoforthelastyear_E91C/image_2.png"&gt;&lt;img style="BORDER-RIGHT-WIDTH: 0px; BORDER-TOP-WIDTH: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM-WIDTH: 0px; BORDER-LEFT-WIDTH: 0px" border="0" alt="image" width="260" height="56" src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/images/unmitigatedrisk_com/WindowsLiveWriter/WhatIhavebeenuptoforthelastyear_E91C/image_thumb.png" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It exposes a set of common tasks related to Biometric devices, these of course include "Use your fingerprint to log on to Windows".&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The control panel applet itself includes a list of Biometric Units that are registered on the machine, this machine (my Lenovo X61) has a Upek based Biometric Unit, you can see it bellow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/images/unmitigatedrisk_com/WindowsLiveWriter/WhatIhavebeenuptoforthelastyear_E91C/image_4.png"&gt;&lt;img style="BORDER-RIGHT-WIDTH: 0px; BORDER-TOP-WIDTH: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM-WIDTH: 0px; BORDER-LEFT-WIDTH: 0px" border="0" alt="image" width="244" height="99" src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/images/unmitigatedrisk_com/WindowsLiveWriter/WhatIhavebeenuptoforthelastyear_E91C/image_thumb_1.png" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From this location you can "Remove your fingerprint data" if you do not feel comfortable with this data being persisted on the machine, or you can manage/enroll fingers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently the platform only supports fingerprint readers, but its designed to support other concepts like facial recognition, vein recognition, geometry, iris and more.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In future versions of Windows, as these technologies become more common I hope to see it expanded to include native support for them as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So far the feedback has been great, the solution is the fastest we have tested and it allows for these solutions to co-exist, so you can buy a laptop with a built in fingerprint sensor from one manufacturer and a mouse with a sensor from another and they can both work on the same machine, unfortunately today that's not normally the the case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is lots more in store for Strong Authentication in Windows 7 also, I will try to write more about this and other features in this area in the future.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/207.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/07/207.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Nov 2008 00:47:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/207.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/11/07/207.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/207.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/207.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Hah, this reminds me of some usability tests I have seen...</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/21/196.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="FONT-SIZE: 9pt; FONT-FAMILY: &amp;quot;Arial&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;sans-serif&amp;quot;"&gt;Have you ever used Live? As a stock holder I hope so&lt;img alt="" src="/Providers/BlogEntryEditor/FCKeditor/editor/images/smiley/msn/teeth_smile.gif" /&gt;, when you register a Live ID or when you change your Live account password you are given a Password Quality Feedback Indicator, a couple friends of mine worked on this, feedback indicators are not new, but the Live one is the first one I had a chance to hear 1st hand about the design process used and how well such systems fair with users in usability tests.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="FONT-SIZE: 9pt; FONT-FAMILY: &amp;quot;Arial&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;sans-serif&amp;quot;"&gt;In any event I ran across a blog post/cartoon on password validation that reminded me of this and made me chuckle, as such I decided it was worth &lt;a href="http://popsicklestrip.blogspot.com/2008/06/password-validation.html"&gt;&lt;font color="#800080"&gt;sharing&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/a&gt; with you.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/196.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/21/196.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Jun 2008 06:06:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/196.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/21/196.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/196.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/196.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Cem has a interesting post on LifeLock</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/18/195.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p&gt;My friend &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;Cem&lt;/font&gt; over at &lt;a spellchecked="true" href="http://randomoracle.wordpress.com/"&gt;Random Oracle&lt;/a&gt; has &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;written&lt;/font&gt; a interesting post on &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;LifeLock&lt;/font&gt;, I have &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;written&lt;/font&gt; about these Identity Theft insurance companies before &lt;a href="http://www.unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2007/08/13/102.aspx"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I am personally signed up with &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt"&gt;&lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.debix.com/"&gt;Debix&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt"&gt;, I recently financed a car and it was awkward to get the financing setup because of the approval process compared to what it would be otherwise, that's really the point though, &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;isn't&lt;/font&gt; it?&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;In any event, I can say at least in my case, I can see how the &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;&lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt"&gt;&lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.debix.com/"&gt;Debix&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;brokering of the fraud alert provides a level of protection that I think is worth having, though in name of full disclosure I did &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;not have&lt;/font&gt; to pay for the service and I have not gone through the personal evaluation process to &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;determine&lt;/font&gt; what the cash value to me is as of yet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;I guess the real proof of value comes in when you have to claim the insurance and you see how awkward that process is&lt;img alt="" src="/Providers/BlogEntryEditor/FCKeditor/editor/images/smiley/msn/wink_smile.gif" /&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;In general though as you can see in my prior post on this topic I am a fan of such programs being &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;underwritten&lt;/font&gt; by a company you know and trust, and &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;LifeLock&lt;/font&gt; is &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;self insured&lt;/font&gt; &lt;img alt="" src="/Providers/BlogEntryEditor/FCKeditor/editor/images/smiley/msn/omg_smile.gif" /&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;That being said there are many types of Identity Theft, and these services don't help protect you from all of them, though they do help in the case of financially oriented threats.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;Check out Cem's post though, its worth a read.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/195.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/18/195.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 05:58:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/195.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/18/195.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/195.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/195.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Did you ever wonder who contributes to Internet standards?</title>
            <link>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/18/194.aspx</link>
            <description>&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;I stopped by the &lt;a href="http://www.maltandvine.com"&gt;Malt and Vine&lt;/a&gt; tonight and picked up some interesting dark beers (I am a huge fan of stouts, porters and dark ales), and while sitting here enjoying a &lt;a href="https://www.maltandvine.com/cgi-bin/commerce.cgi?preadd=action&amp;amp;key=1571"&gt;Dogfish Head World Wide Stout&lt;/a&gt; I figured I would look at &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;IETF&lt;/font&gt; statistics (I am a wild one!).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;&lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;Jari&lt;/font&gt; &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;Arkko&lt;/font&gt; runs a great website that tracks this, its worth &lt;a href="http://www.arkko.com/tools/docstats.html"&gt;checking out&lt;/a&gt; some of the more interesting charts he has are the &lt;a href="http://www.arkko.com/tools/rfcstats/companydistr.html"&gt;affiliation chart&lt;/a&gt;, the &lt;a href="http://www.arkko.com/tools/rfcstats/companydistrhist.html"&gt;historical affiliation&lt;/a&gt; and of course there is &lt;a href="http://www.arkko.com/tools/allstats/ryanhurst.html"&gt;me&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;The author stats &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;dont&lt;/font&gt; show contributions to specifications where a individual or company is not listed as a explicit author, and there are general (unpublished?) rules around how many authors can/should be listed so contributors often are relegated to a un-tracked &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;acknowledgement&lt;/font&gt; sections or no reference at all (one can check news group archives to find many of these folks, they do matter).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;So, like all &lt;a spellchecked="true" href="http://www.arkko.com/tools/allstats/ryanhurst.html"&gt;statistics take these numbers with a grain of salt&lt;/a&gt;; don't get me wrong they do provide value, with that being said some things are so &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;exaggerated&lt;/font&gt; you can't help but notice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;For example, look at the &lt;a href="http://www.arkko.com/tools/rfcstats/companydistr.html"&gt;author distribution&lt;/a&gt; for CISCO relative to their closest peer (its 2.5 times!!); this is no &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;surprise&lt;/font&gt; to anyone who has participated in the &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;&lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;IETF&lt;/font&gt;, its pretty common to go into a &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;hum (a consensus process in the &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;IETF&lt;/font&gt;) and see a room with a bunch of CISCO people in it.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;Another interesting thing to notice is the number of authors in a given company, &lt;a href="http://www.arkko.com/tools/rfcstats/c_microsoft.html"&gt;Microsoft has 65&lt;/a&gt; (making them/us #5) while &lt;a href="http://www.arkko.com/tools/rfcstats/c_cisco.html"&gt;CISCO has 255&lt;/a&gt; (They are #1 in participation); &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;that's&lt;/font&gt; not to say that more authors is better or worse, like all things the devil is in the details.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt;A couple statistics I think would be interesting, probably more interesting IMHO, would be a historical trend of standard velocity (how long standards take to get completed in the &lt;font class="misspellet" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;IETF&lt;/font&gt; over time) another would be some metric that showed specification &lt;font class="" face="fmisspellt" spellchecked="true"&gt;vs.&lt;/font&gt; deployment on the internet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Well back to my beer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p spellchecked="true"&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/aggbug/194.aspx" width="1" height="1" /&gt;</description>
            <dc:creator>Ryan M. Hurst</dc:creator>
            <guid>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/18/194.aspx</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 05:25:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <wfw:comment>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/194.aspx</wfw:comment>
            <comments>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/archive/2008/06/18/194.aspx#feedback</comments>
            <wfw:commentRss>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/comments/commentRss/194.aspx</wfw:commentRss>
            <trackback:ping>http://unmitigatedrisk.com/services/trackbacks/194.aspx</trackback:ping>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>